Stephen E. Blythe 1

Hong Kong is perhaps the “most wired” city in the world and has one of the best environments for e-commerce. Hong Kong's e-signature law is a major contributing factor to this environment. The Electronic Transactions Ordinance Act of 2000 (“ETO”) allowed the utilization of only one form of electronic signature-digital. This ran contrary to the trend in global electronic signature law; which encourages nations to give legal recognition to more than one. Accordingly, the ETO was amended in 2004 to allow for: (1) multiple forms of electronic signatures to be used in the private sector, with retention of the digital signature requirement for official electronic communiqués with the government; (2) electronic delivery whenever the law specifies that delivery is to be “by post or in person;” (3) bifurcation of the Annual Report of Compliance Assessment pertaining to certification authorities (“CA”), with one part to be performed by an independent auditor, and the other part to be achieved with submission of a sworn statement from the CA; and (4) a requirement that major changes in the CA's organization must be reported immediately to the government. Also in 2004, and pursuant to the ETO, the government issued the Code of Practice, a lengthy document meticulously specifying the standards and procedures for carrying out the functions of a CA. The Code of Practice includes detailed requirements for both the CA's Annual Report of Compliance Assessment, as well as the requirements for the contents of the CA's Certification Practice Statement. Both of these documents are required to be submitted to the government by the CA and play an important role in oversight of their activities. Therefore, while the amended ETO now recognizes the validity of more than one form of electronic signature, it is strengthening the degree of trustworthiness of digital signatures through more stringent regulation of CAs. However, consumer protections remain deficient; the author recommends that the ETO be amended again to rectify this oversight.

Editor's Note: In Volume 6, Issue 1 of the North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology, Kate Reder published an article on a related topic, entitled "Ashcroft v. ACLU: Should Congress Try, Try, and Try Again, or Does the International Problem of Regulating Internet Pornography Require an International Solution?" 6 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 139 (2004). In that article the author discussed the .xxx domain as one of possible solution to filtering software or Congressional regulation. The following article takes the subject one step further, discussing the legal ramifications for adult entertainment companies who become engaged in a domain dispute involving a .xxx tag.

Jennifer D. Phillips 1

Cite as 7 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 233 (2005) | Download PDF

Elizabeth Helmer 1

This comment explores the ways in which the doctrines of preemption, and more recently, complete preemption are being applied to the Copyright Act. In deciding whether claims are preempted by the Copyright Act, courts apply the “Extra Element Test.” However, courts are increasingly applying this test by looking at the facts underlying the claim, rather than the elements needed to prove the claim, and preempting more readily. Once satisfied that the claim is preempted, some courts are allowing complete preemption to take hold, and removing the claim to federal court. Courts have traditionally tried to determine whether Congress intended to allow removal, since Congressional intent is the touchstone of removal jurisdiction. However, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, some courts have departed with the Congressional intent requirement, holding that by wholly displacing an area of law, Congress intended to create complete preemption . This lax application of the complete preemption doctrine has led to unexplainable results, undermines Congressional intent to preserve various state law claims, and threatens to erode long standing jurisdictional principles.

Cite as 7 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 205 (2005) | Download PDF

Hannah R. Short 1

The Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster decision extended secondary liability for copyright infringement to companies who distribute software that enables its users to commit infringement. The theory of holding Internet-based companies liable for enabling users to violate laws can be applied outside the narrow context of copyright law. A host of websites allow users to scalp tickets via the Internet. Among them is StubHub.com, a particularly successful ticket resale website. Many users of StubHub.com violate state scalping laws. StubHub.com places the responsibility of compliance with scalping laws solely on its users. Attorneys general and local law enforcement agencies may find it difficult to enforce ticket sales laws against individual scalpers who use the Internet to resell tickets. Grokster may offer an approach for holding the operators of ticket resale sites secondarily liable for illegal activity of their users.

Cite as 7 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 181 (2005) | Download PDF

Aaron Harmon 1

For Confrontation Clause purposes, child testimony by two-way closed circuit television is substantively different from one-way closed circuit television. Two-way closed circuit testimony is preferable because it more closely approximates face-to-face confrontation. The Supreme Court's case-specific holding in Maryland v. Craig was directed at one-way closed circuit testimony. As such, the Eighth Circuit was mistaken in conflating the two forms of testimony when it relied on Craig to overturn both United States v. Turning Bear and United States v. Bordeaux, and was similarly mistaken in holding that § 3509 of the Child Victims' and Witnesses' Rights statute was unconstitutional to the extent it conflicted with Craig.

Cite as 7 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 157 (2005) | Download PDF

Heather A. Crews 1

This Recent Development proposes that California's new precedent for deciding maternity disputes arising pursuant to gestational surrogacy arrangements weakens legal protections afforded to the following populations: women who choose to donate eggs without becoming mothers, women who serve as gestational surrogates to friends or family members, and women who accept egg donations without also accepting the donor as a co-parent. The rule of law previously applied to surrogacy disputes as articulated in Johnson v. Calvert protects the interests of parties creating families through surrogacy while preserving one of the few procreative methods available to lesbian couples. The Johnson intent standard should not be limited by the Supreme Court of California's holding in K.M. v. E.G.

Cite as 7 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2005) | Download PDF

Randy Diamond 1

Cite as 7 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 67 (2005) | Download PDF